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INTRODUCTION 
Capital punishment predates the modern nation-state. Until the 
twentieth century, the death penalty was administered by 
extraordinarily harsh and brutal means, such as burning at the stake, 
skinning alive, and crucifixion.1 Today in the United States, more 
humane means such as lethal injection and electrocution are used to 
carry out the death penalty. Just as the means of administering the 
death penalty have evolved over time, so have attitudes toward 
capital punishment in general. In the past century, the United States 
Supreme Court has revised death penalty doctrine, showing concern 
with when and to whom it is applied and with how it is carried out. 
Although it is not surprising that the doctrine has evolved over time, 
considering that it is founded on a flexible standard found in the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution,2 what is surprising is that the 
Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has demonstrated an 
overall trend restricting the power of the state in favor of the human 
rights of accused individuals. Even more surprising is that death 
penalty doctrine in the United States has almost uniformly followed 
in the footsteps of death penalty developments in other Western 
developed democracies. 
This pattern seems too consistent to be coincidental, but how can 
the fact that the United States has so closely followed Europe’s lead 
be explained? The ability to influence state behavior in the field of 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Krista L. Patterson. 
 1. Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 336 (1996). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”). 
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human rights has traditionally been understood through a framework 
consisting of two methods: coercion and persuasion.3 However, these 
two methods do not seem to explain fully the changes in United 
States death penalty doctrine. Coercive measures have been 
infrequently applied, and the impact of direct attempts at persuading 
the United States to alter its death penalty doctrine is questionable.4 
Thus, it is probable that another, less obvious method of influence is 
at work. 
In an article entitled, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, Professors Ryan Goodman and 
Derek Jinks explore the theory that international human rights are 
not spread primarily by coercive or persuasive measures, but instead 
by a method they refer to as acculturation.5 They state, 
“[Acculturation] induces behavioral changes through pressures to 
assimilate—some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the 
self.”6 Acculturation helps to more fully explain the similarities 
between the development of death penalty doctrine in Europe and in 
the United States as it accounts for the subtle pressures that induce 
the United States to conform. 
This Note analyzes how the various methods of influencing state 
behavior, as outlined by Goodman and Jinks, apply to changes in 
United States death penalty jurisprudence. Part I provides 
background on how the use of the death penalty has evolved in both 
Europe and the United States, laying out relevant similarities. Part II 
presents a summary of Goodman and Jinks’ modality, providing a 
framework for understanding how the United States’ death penalty 
doctrine has been influenced. Part III then applies this framework, 
evaluating the effectiveness of coercion, persuasion, and 
acculturation, each as defined by Goodman and Jinks’ modality, as 
motivating factors behind the evolution of death penalty doctrine in 
the United States. Part III further argues that coercion and 
persuasion inadequately explain developments in American death 
penalty doctrine, and that Goodman and Jinks’ idea of acculturation 
 
 3. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 625 (2004) (discussing how the “first 
generation” of international human rights scholarship found that change occurred as a result of 
coercion and persuasion). 
 4. See infra Parts III.A–III.B. 
 5. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 626. 
 6. Id. 
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is necessary to a complete understanding of how death penalty 
doctrine in the United States has changed. The Note concludes with 
speculation on how coercion, persuasion, and particularly 
acculturation may affect death penalty doctrine in the United States 
in the future. 
I.  A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON 
A. Death Penalty Doctrine in Europe 
The first attempts to abolish the death penalty in Europe 
occurred at the end of the eighteenth century.7 Prior to this period, 
the death penalty was widely applied in Europe by a variety of 
barbaric means.8 However, the rise in humanitarian philosophy at the 
end of the eighteenth century caused state leaders to reevaluate their 
treatment of those found guilty of crimes.9 Leaders began to develop 
more humane systems of penal law under the influence of 
philosophers such as Cesare Beccaria, who criticized the death 
penalty in his treatise Of Crime and Punishment.10 In this spirit, 
several states called for the abolition of the death penalty during this 
period, including Tuscany, Austria, and France.11 
Although abolitionist sentiment was strong at the end of the 
eighteenth century in Europe, it was short-lived. Soon after 
provisions abolishing the death penalty were put in place, they were 
reversed,12 and the French Code Civil, which served as the foundation 
for codes in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, called for 
 
 7. Roger Hood, Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN EUROPE 9, 10 
(Tanja Kleinsorge & Barbara Zatlokal eds., 1999). 
 8. M. MARC ANCEL, EUROPEAN COMM’N ON CRIME PROBLEMS, THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 8 (1962). 
 9. Id. at 9. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Ancel notes that 
Leopold II of Tuscany abolished capital punishment in the Tuscan Penal Code of 
1786 . . . and Joseph II abolished it in the Austrian Code of 1787. . . . With regard to 
French law, it is to be noted that the decree of the Convention of 14th Brumaire of 
the Year IV provided for the abolition of capital punishment when peace should be 
re-established, but it never took effect, even after the Peace of Amiens. 
Id. at 9. 
 12. Hood, supra note 7, at 10; see also ANCEL, supra note 8, at 9 (“Austria re-introduced 
the death penalty for high treason in 1795 and for other crimes as well in the Code of 1803, 
while Tuscany also reverted to it in 1730.”). 
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the death penalty as the punishment for a number of crimes.13 
Additionally, the death penalty served as the punishment for over 200 
crimes in England at the turn of the nineteenth century.14 
Despite the widespread use of the death penalty in the early 
1800s, abolitionist movements again began to emerge around 1830.15 
The changes brought about by these movements were gradual, first 
consisting of declining use of the death penalty before changes in the 
law occurred.16 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, a 
number of European countries had adopted policies and legislation 
against the use of capital punishment.17 
Further setbacks in the complete abolition of the death penalty 
in Europe again occurred during the first half of the twentieth 
century. The authoritarian movement caused a number of countries 
to reinstate capital punishment, including Italy, Austria, and 
Germany.18 Furthermore, the Second World War caused even states 
with strong abolitionist sentiment to reinstate the death penalty for 
certain war-related crimes.19 
Despite these temporary setbacks, the trend toward the abolition 
of the death penalty in Europe continued after the end of the Second 
World War.20 By 1962, only the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic, 
Spain, Turkey, Greece, and France carried out executions in Europe, 
and by 1977, Turkey was the only state not to have abandoned capital 
 
 13. ANCEL, supra note 8, at 9. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 10; see, e.g., Hood, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that Portugal did not abolish the 
death penalty until 1863, but it had not been imposed since 1843). 
 17. For example, in France the list of crimes punishable by death was shortened to exclude 
forgery, compound larceny, and eventually political crimes. Additionally, juries in France were 
given increased discretion in applying the death penalty. ANCEL, supra note 8, at 10. In 
Germany, the 1849 Constitution ineffectively attempted to abolish the death penalty in German 
States. Id. In Spain, a bill to abolish the death penalty was introduced in 1822. Id. In the United 
Kingdom, there was a drastic reduction in the number of offenses punishable by death in the 
1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Id. In Portugal, the death penalty was completely 
abolished in 1863, a step later taken by Romania, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands. Hood, 
supra note 7, at 10. 
 18. See ANCEL, supra note 8, at 11–12 (detailing the authoritarian movement in Italy, 
Germany, and Austria, in which German law was applicable from 1938 until 1945). 
 19. See id. at 12 (noting that Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands brought back the 
death penalty for treason, war crimes, and collaboration with the enemy). 
 20. See id. at 12–13 (observing that “the movement has always been towards the abolition 
of capital punishment” and in particular noting the post-war movements toward abolition in 
England, Italy, Germany, and Austria). 
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punishment.21 Movement in the direction of the abolition of the death 
penalty could even be seen in former Soviet countries, known for 
using the death penalty as a political tool, by the late 1980s.22 
The trend toward abolition in individual European countries in 
the latter half of the twentieth century was accompanied by the 
development of regional and international human rights regimes, 
many of which advocated the abolition of the death penalty. The first 
major step toward an international human rights system and the 
abolition of the death penalty on an international scale was the 
United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948.23 Article 3 of the UDHR states, “Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”24 Although this 
provision did not specifically urge the abolition of the death penalty, 
the “right to life” language provided an important springboard for 
future developments. 
This language can be seen in the next major document in the 
development of the international human rights regime: the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).25 The 
ICCPR built on the UDHR by both adding detail and providing 
binding norms.26 Article 6 of the ICCPR provides, “Every human 
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”27 Although the 
ICCPR did not prohibit the use of the death penalty, except involving 
those under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime, article 6 did 
state, “Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent 
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present 
Covenant.”28 The wording of article 6 thus indicated a preference for 
the abolition of the death penalty. 
The preference for the abolition of the death penalty in the 
ICCPR was strengthened into a requirement in the subsequent 
 
 21. Hood, supra note 7, at 10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 24. Id. art. 3. 
 25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 26. Although the UDHR was a declaration, the ICCPR was a treaty and was thus binding 
on those states that ratified it. 
 27. ICCPR art. 6, para. 1. 
 28. Id. para. 6. 
04__PATTERSON.DOC 10/13/2006 8:50 AM 
1222 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1217 
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.29 The Second Optional 
Protocol provides, “No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to 
the present Protocol shall be executed. Each State Party shall take all 
necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its 
jurisdiction.”30 Although the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
was only binding on those states that ratified it, it represented the first 
statement of an emerging international norm against capital 
punishment. Other recent international human rights treaties contain 
provisions on capital punishment as well, such as the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC).31 
The development of a regional human rights system that led to 
the Europe-wide abolition of the death penalty accompanied these 
international developments in human rights. The first major step in 
the development of a European regional human rights system was the 
creation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).32 
The Council of Europe created the ECHR, which came into force on 
September 3, 1953, in order to form a list of fundamental rights and 
freedoms under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Article 2 of the ECHR states, “Everyone’s right to life shall 
be protected by law.”33 However, the ECHR did not abolish capital 
punishment, but instead preserved it, stating, “No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of 
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is 
provided by law.”34 
The trend toward abolition in individual European states began 
to influence region-wide change after a 1962 survey by Marc Ancel 
for the Council of Europe illustrated the uniformity of European 
states’ trend toward abolition.35 By the end of the 1970s, the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had begun to 
 
 29. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. 
No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol]. 
 30. Id. art. 1. 
 31. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 48, at 
166, U.N. Doc. A/Res/ 44/99 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC]. 
 32. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 33. Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally ANCEL, supra note 8.  
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consider the death penalty a human rights issue.36 Once the Council of 
Europe established that the death penalty violated human rights, the 
need for region-wide abolition became apparent, and the Committee 
of Ministers decided to create a protocol to the ECHR that would 
ban capital punishment in European countries.37 Thus, Protocol 
Number 6 to the ECHR was drafted and entered into force on March 
1, 1985.38 
Protocol Number 6 was the first Europe-wide pronouncement on 
the abolition of the death penalty. Article 1 of Protocol Number 6 
states, “The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be 
condemned to such penalty or executed.”39 Thus, the protocol directly 
prohibited the death penalty and did not require any action on the 
part of the states.40 It is important to note, however, that although 
Protocol Number 6 was a large step in the abolition of the death 
penalty in Europe, it still provided states with the option of using the 
death penalty during times of war.41 
The next important step in the abolition of the death penalty in 
Europe came when the Council of Europe decided in 1993 that 
applicants to the Council must sign and ratify the ECHR.42 By 1994, 
the Parliamentary Assembly strengthened this requirement, stating 
that applicants to the Council must put in place an immediate 
moratorium on executions followed by the signature and ratification 
of Protocol Number 6 to the ECHR abolishing the death penalty in 
peacetime.43 Thus, all Council of Europe members were required to 
abolish the death penalty in times of peace. 
Recent changes in Europe have reflected a similar emphasis on 
the abolition of the death penalty. In 2002, the Council of Europe 
 
 36. Hans Christian Krüger, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
in THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN EUROPE, supra note 7, at 69, 70 (1999). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, art. 1, 
Europ. T.S. No. 114 [hereinafter Protocol No. 6]. 
 40. Krüger, supra note 36, at 70. 
 41. See Protocol No. 6 art. 2 (“A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty 
in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be 
applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. The 
State shall communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the relevant 
provisions of that law.”). 
 42. Hood, supra note 7, at 11. 
 43. Id. 
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adopted Protocol Number 13 to the ECHR,44 which supplements 
Protocol Number 6 by calling for the complete abolition of the death 
penalty, even during times of war. Furthermore, in order to become a 
member of the European Union (EU) a state must have abolished 
capital punishment.45 Additionally, the EU has undertaken measures 
to persuade other states to abolish the death penalty, including the 
Guidelines to European Union Policy toward Third Countries on the 
Death Penalty.46 
Europe has been moving slowly toward the abolition of the death 
penalty for centuries. Early periods of abolitionist sentiment were 
followed by setbacks to the abolition of the death penalty, but since 
the creation of international human rights regimes in the latter-half of 
the twentieth century, Europe has moved rapidly toward abolition 
under the premise that capital punishment violates human rights. 
Although the United States has yet to reach the final step of 
abolition, up to this point, the developments in American death 
penalty doctrine follow a very similar path to the European 
developments just described. 
B. Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States 
Capital punishment has occurred in the United States since 
before the country’s inception. The first documented execution on 
U.S. soil occurred in 1608.47 When the Constitution was written, the 
Framers were aware of capital punishment, and the lack of any 
explicit prohibition on capital punishment in the Constitution 
indicates that they were also tolerant of it.48 The provision in the 
Constitution that most closely relates to capital punishment is the 
Eighth Amendment, which states, “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”49 Although the Framers did not intend for the 
 
 44. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, 
May 3, 2002, Europ. T.S. No. 183 [hereinafter Protocol No. 13]; see also Nora V. Demleitner, 
The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 138 
(2002). 
 45. Hood, supra note 7, at 11. 
 46. Guidelines to European Union Policy towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty, 
June 3, 1998, available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Guidelines.htm. 
 47. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 3 (1991). 
 48. Id. 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
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“cruel and unusual punishment” provision to outlaw capital 
punishment,50 it has since been interpreted as an evolving standard,51 
and it is the primary source used by abolitionists to argue for the 
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. 
Until the 1900s, the death penalty in America was primarily 
under local control.52 Initially, colonies created their own penal 
systems and imposed the death penalty as they saw fit.53 The use of 
the death penalty was influenced by British tradition,54 although the 
death penalty was applied far less extensively in the colonies, in 
particular those in the North, than it was applied in England.55 In 
America, the death penalty was mostly reserved for serious crimes 
such as murder and rape; however some colonies imposed capital 
punishment for religious crimes and other offenses.56 Conversely, in 
England the list of crimes for which the death penalty was imposed 
grew longer and longer during this period.57 
The first steps toward restricting the use of the death penalty in 
America occurred shortly after the United States became a nation. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts led the way by restricting the 
list of crimes for which death was a penalty.58 Other states followed 
suit, limiting the number of crimes subject to the death penalty and, 
for some states, dividing the crime of murder into degrees.59 Such 
actions on the part of the states signaled the beginning of a gradual 
shift from a locally controlled death penalty regime to one controlled 
 
 50. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 3 (“Since the Fifth Amendment ensured that no 
person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, the implication 
was that with such due process of law such deprivations were acceptable.”). 
 51. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 52. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 3. 
 53. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (2002) 
(“England’s North American colonies exhibited significant regional variation in their criminal 
codes right from the beginning.”). 
 54. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5 (outlining the contemporary history of capital 
punishment in England and noting its pervasive influence on the colonies). 
 55. See BANNER, supra note 53, at 6 (stating that property crimes in particular were treated 
much more leniently in the northern colonies than in England). 
 56. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5. 
 57. BANNER, supra note 53, at 7. 
 58. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that capital crimes were reduced to 
include only “murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson, rape, and treason”). 
 59. Id. at 6. 
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by the state, although this process was not completed until the 
twentieth century.60 
The sentiment of the American people regarding the death 
penalty was similarly evolving during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and the first public discussions on whether the 
death penalty should be completely abolished were initiated during 
this period.61 As the debate over the death penalty continued into the 
nineteenth century, abolitionists organized themselves alongside anti-
slavery and temperance groups.62 In 1845, the first national 
organization opposing the death penalty was created: the American 
Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment.63 Popular opinion 
against the death penalty accompanied the trend of state 
governments restricting the death penalty to fewer crimes in fewer 
circumstances. 
The work of death penalty abolitionists began to come to fruition 
during the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1846, Michigan 
became the first state to abolish capital punishment for all crimes but 
treason.64 In the next ten years, Rhode Island and Wisconsin 
completely abolished the death penalty for all crimes,65 and during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, three more states, Iowa, Maine 
and Colorado, completely abolished the death penalty.66 The 
abolitionists were beginning to make headway, although their 
progress soon slowed and became plagued by setbacks, such as Iowa’s 
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1878, Maine’s temporary 
reinstatement of the death penalty from 1883 through 1887, and 
Colorado’s reinstatement of the death penalty in 1901.67 
The trend toward abolition was revived during the progressive 
era accompanying the turn of the twentieth century.68 Nine states—
 
 60. See id. at 7 (“In the 1890s, 86 percent of all executions were performed under local 
authority, but by the 1920s almost eight out of every ten executions were conducted under state 
authority.”). 
 61. See BANNER, supra note 53, at 88 (describing the abolitionist sentiment present in 
newspaper editorials, letters, and political figures’ works of the 1780s and 1790s). 
 62. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Rhode Island did so in 1852, Wisconsin in 1853. Id. 
 66. Iowa did so in 1872. Maine did so in 1876. Colorado did so in 1897. Id. 
 67. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 6 tbl.1-1 (1974). 
 68. See id. at 7 (discussing the progressive ideas prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth 
century such as abolitionism, feminism, prohibition, and prison reform). 
04__PATTERSON.DOC 10/13/2006 8:50 AM 
2006] DEATH PENALTY 1227 
Kansas, Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Arizona, and Missouri—did away with the death 
penalty during this period.69 However, the beginning of the First 
World War again produced setbacks in the abolitionist movement, 
causing six of the nine states that had just abolished the death penalty 
to reinstate it.70 After Kansas later reinstated the death penalty,71 only 
six states remained abolitionist by the middle of the 1900s.72 
Despite the setbacks incurred thus far, the movement to abolish 
the death penalty again gained strength during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Alaska and Hawaii were both abolitionist when 
they became states in 1960,73 and all nine states to abolish capital 
punishment in the second half of the twentieth century remain 
abolitionist to this day, with the exception of Delaware.74 
Furthermore, even in states where capital punishment was legal, it 
was used less and less, causing the number of executions to decline 
drastically from 1930 to 1970.75 
Most of the influential developments in United States death 
penalty doctrine before 1970 took place in state legislatures; however 
in 1972 the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia76 began a 
period during which the most influential changes in the death penalty 
have come from the federal judiciary. Since Furman, the Supreme 
Court has played a significant role in moving the United States down 
Europe’s path by continually restricting the constitutionality of the 
death penalty.77 
The Court in Furman did not go so far as to find the death 
penalty to be unconstitutional; however it did find, by a 5 to 4 margin, 
that the death penalty, as it was applied in Furman and two 
accompanying cases, was “cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”78 The practical result of 
 
 69. See id. at 6 tbl.1-1 (listing the 9 states that abolished the death penalty between the turn 
of the twentieth century and World War I). 
 70. See id. (noting that Minnesota, North Dakota, and Kansas were the only states of the 
nine above who did not reinstate the death penalty during this period). 
 71. See id. (showing that Kansas reinstated the death penalty in 1935). 
 72. Id. at 7. 
 73. Alaska and Hawaii repealed the death penalty as territories in 1957. Id. 
 74. Delaware only abolished the death penalty from 1958 to 1961. Id. at 6 tbl.1-1. 
 75. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 11 fig.1-1. 
 76. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 77. See infra notes 78–97 and accompanying text. 
 78. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. 
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Furman was to strike down all existing capital punishment statutes 
because of the unguided and unregulated discretion given by these 
statutes to criminal juries in death penalty cases.79 Thus, in order to 
continue using the death penalty, it was necessary for states to revise 
their capital punishment sentencing guidelines in conformity with 
Furman. As many as thirty-five states attempted to reinstate the 
death penalty with revised statutes.80 However, they were compelled 
to meet further requirements delineated by the Court in later cases 
such as Gregg v. Georgia,81 which held that statutes requiring the 
mandatory imposition of the death penalty in certain situations were 
unconstitutional, while statutes that merely guided the discretion of 
jurors in death penalty cases withstood constitutional scrutiny.82 
Despite the fact that many states passed new legislation to 
reinstate the death penalty after the brief pause instituted by Furman, 
since Furman the death penalty has been used less frequently than 
ever before in the United States. Raymond Paternoster asserts, 
“Since the reinstatement of capital punishment only a handful of 
offenders have been executed each year.”83 The decline in the use of 
the death penalty has resulted from legislative and executive action 
by states, from the discretion of jurors and judges, and most 
importantly, from action on the part of the Supreme Court restricting 
capital punishment. 
One of the means by which the Court has limited the death 
penalty is by restricting the crimes for which the death penalty can be 
a punishment. In Coker v. Georgia84 the Supreme Court held that 
capital punishment could not be imposed for rape,85 and in Enmund v. 
Florida86 the Court restricted when the death penalty could be applied 
for felony murder.87 In both of these cases, the Court focused its 
analysis on whether applying the death penalty for those convicted of 
rape or felony murder would be consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment’s evolving standard, and in both cases the Supreme 
 
 79. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 19. 
 80. Id. at 20. 
 81. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 82. Id. at 206–07; see also PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 21. 
 83. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 21. 
 84. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 85. Id. at 598. 
 86. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 87. Id. at 801. 
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Court defined this standard by looking at objective factors, such as 
actions of state legislatures and sentencing juries, to determine “the 
country’s present judgment.”88 
The Court has also attempted to gauge national opinion in its 
decisions regulating to whom the death penalty can be applied. In 
Atkins v. Virginia,89 the Supreme Court held that the death penalty 
could not be applied to those who are mentally retarded,90 and in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma91 the Court found it cruel and unusual 
punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to execute 
someone who was fifteen or fewer years of age at the time of the 
crime.92 The reach of Thompson was limited by Stanford v. 
Kentucky,93 which upheld the constitutionality of applying the death 
penalty to someone who was seventeen years of age at the time of the 
crime.94 However, this decision was overruled in the recent Supreme 
Court case Roper v. Simmons.95 In Simmons, the Court found the 
execution of those under the age of 18 at the time of the crime to be 
unconstitutional under the evolving Eighth Amendment standard.96 
All of these cases turned on the Court’s appraisal of “national 
consensus,” as evidenced primarily by state legislative action 
regarding the death penalty.97 
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Court’s 
appraisal of national consensus in these cases evidence an overall 
trend toward restricting the death penalty in the United States. As a 
result of Supreme Court decisions, those convicted of felony murder 
or rape, mentally retarded individuals, and those under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime can no longer be 
executed.98 Currently, thirty-eight states still have statutes imposing 
 
 88. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593; accord Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788–89 (discussing Coker’s 
approach and analyzing issue “in a similar manner”). 
 89. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 90. Id. at 321. 
 91. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 92. Id. at 838. 
 93. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005). 
 94. Id. at 380. 
 95. Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 96. Id. at 578. 
 97. See id. at 564 (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as 
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. This 
data gives us essential instructions.”). 
 98. See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text. 
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the death penalty, but only thirty-three of these states have executed 
someone since 1976.99 In 2004, only fifty-nine people were executed 
nation-wide and in 2005, this number was only sixty.100 These numbers 
are down from the ninety-eight people executed in 1999 and the 
eighty-five people executed in 2000.101 Furthermore, the number of 
people sentenced to death hit a record low in 2004—65 percent fewer 
than in 1998.102 
Although, just as in Europe, there have been temporary setbacks 
over time, American death penalty doctrine is slowly moving toward 
abolition. In particular, the jurisprudence of the United States 
Supreme Court has almost uniformly moved in the direction of 
abolition since 1972.103 In order to evaluate whether these similarities 
between European and American death penalty doctrine will result in 
the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the United States, it is 
important to understand why the developments in Europe and the 
United States have been so similar. 
II.  GOODMAN AND JINKS’ MODALITY 
In order to understand why the United States’ death penalty 
doctrine has developed largely in the footsteps of Europe’s, one must 
look to how states influence one another in general. In How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks set forth a framework that attempts 
to provide a comprehensive understanding of how states influence 
 
 99. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty 1, (May 12, 2006), http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited June 4, 2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. In 2005, only 125 people were sentenced to death nationwide. American Judicature 
Society, http://www.ajs.org/include/story.asp?content_id=478 (last visited June 4, 2006). In 1998 
this number was approximately 300. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 99, at 3. 
 103. The only exception to the Supreme Court’s continual restriction of the death penalty 
was Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which was recently abrogated by Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). It should also be noted that federal legislation has somewhat 
undermined the trend in restricting the death penalty by narrowing the scope of habeas corpus 
relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 
104–108, 110 Stat. 1214–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). However, 
changes in the scope of habeas corpus are only important to death penalty doctrine once a death 
sentence has already been imposed, and it is at this initial sentencing level that the Supreme 
Court’s restrictions take effect. 
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one another, particularly in the field of human rights.104 Goodman and 
Jinks’ modality provides a foundation for understanding the 
influential factors that have shaped American death penalty doctrine. 
In Goodman and Jinks’ framework, there are three mechanisms 
by which states influence one another: coercion, persuasion, and 
acculturation. By carefully differentiating and defining these three 
mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks provide a modality for 
understanding the complexities of state interaction with regard to 
human rights. 
For Goodman and Jinks, coercion is the “first, and most obvious, 
social mechanism.”105 It entails the deliberate practice of states 
providing “material rewards and punishments” to other states in 
order to “escalat[e] the benefits of conformity or the costs of 
nonconformity.”106 Thus, in essence coercion works by altering a 
state’s cost-benefit calculations in favor of a certain result.107 
Since coercion depends upon one state’s ability to alter another 
state’s cost-benefit calculation, coercion necessarily implicates power 
dynamics among states. Goodman and Jinks assert, “Under the 
coercion approach, traditional notions of power—military and 
economic—provide the principal machinery for changing state 
practices.”108 States can coerce other states through the unilateral 
employment of military or economic measures or threats, or they can 
cooperate with other states through treaty instrumentalities, 
funneling their coercive influence through international law.109 Either 
way, coercion requires some level of individual or pooled military or 
economic power to effectively influence state behavior. 
For Goodman and Jinks, persuasion is a less forceful, but equally 
deliberate mechanism of state-to-state influence. Goodman and Jinks 
define persuasion as “the active, often strategic, inculcation of 
norms. . . . [in which] actors are consciously convinced of the truth, 
validity, or appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.”110 Under 
 
 104. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 625–26 (proposing that their acculturation 
analysis will help provide a “more complete conceptual framework”). 
 105. Id. at 633. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 634. 
 108. Id. at 690. 
 109. See id. at 691 (discussing the possibilities of coercive influence through treaties, in 
particular “agreements with teeth”). 
 110. Id. at 635. 
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persuasion, both states are aware of the persuasive effort, thus one 
state must use overt measures such as careful argument and reasoned 
logic to assert its influence. 
The obvious nature of persuasion makes the means through 
which it is employed particularly important to its effectiveness. 
Goodman and Jinks outline several techniques that enhance a 
persuasive effort, including framing and cuing.111 Framing relates to 
the substantive context in which the persuasive material is presented. 
“The basic idea,” they state, “is that the persuasive appeal of a 
counterattitudinal message increases if the issue is strategically 
framed to resonate with already accepted norms.”112 Cuing relates to 
the procedural context in which the persuasive material is presented. 
Proper cuing results in a target audience “‘think[ing] harder’ about 
the merits of a counterattitudinal message.”113 Both framing and cuing 
attempt to render a state more open to the persuasiveness of another 
state’s arguments. 
Goodman and Jinks suggest that, although coercion and 
persuasion were the predominant mechanisms explored in “[f]irst 
generation scholarship” on human rights laws,114 they provide an 
incomplete framework insofar as coercion “fails to grasp the 
complexity of the social environment within which states act” and 
persuasion “fails to account for many ways in which the diffusion of 
social and legal norms occurs.”115 Thus, they suggest that a third 
mechanism is necessary to a more complete understanding of how 
states influence one another, a mechanism they term 
“acculturation.”116 Acculturation is an important, but systematically 
undervalued, social mechanism,117 defined as “the general process of 
adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding 
culture,” and works not by direct means of influence, but instead by 
“changing the actor’s social environment.”118 Thus, for one state to 
influence another, acculturation requires a state to somehow 
 
 111. Id. at 636–37. 
 112. Id. at 636. 
 113. Id. at 637. 
 114. Id. at 625. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 626. 
 117. See id. at 700 (“[A]n integrated model should take seriously the processes of 
acculturation. Indeed, acculturation has been systematically undervalued (and, at times, 
misunderstood) in debates about human rights regimes.”). 
 118. Id. at 638. 
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influence the target state’s group identifications. In the field of human 
rights, Goodman and Jinks posit that influencing group identifications 
may not be a complex undertaking, as they see an emerging global 
social environment within which human rights norms can be spread.119 
Once a target state is firmly within the appropriate social 
environment, acculturating that state to the desired norm requires 
another state to apply a variety of cognitive and social pressures. 
Goodman and Jinks outline two types of cognitive pressures that play 
a role in acculturation: “(1) social-psychological costs of 
nonconformity (such as dissonance associated with conduct that is 
inconsistent with an actor’s identity or social roles), and (2) social-
psychological benefits of conforming to group norms and 
expectations (such as the ‘cognitive comfort’ associated with both 
high social status and membership in a perceived ‘in-group’).”120 A 
state applying these cognitive pressures creates “‘[c]ognitive 
dissonance’” in the target state as a result of the difference between 
the pressures and the target state’s counter-attitudinal actions or 
beliefs, with the aim that the target state will relieve this dissonance 
by conforming to the desired norm.121 
Goodman and Jinks also identify two types of social pressures 
that play a role in acculturation: “(1) the imposition of social-
psychological costs through shaming or shunning and (2) the 
conferral of social-psychological benefits through ‘back-patting’ and 
other displays of public approval.”122 These pressures are more 
obvious than cognitive pressures and play on a target state’s need for 
social legitimacy and status rather than its internal sense of legitimacy 
and justifiability. A combination of both cognitive and social 
pressures is most likely to produce the desired result. 
One final set of variables presented by Goodman and Jinks 
influence the effectiveness of acculturation independently from the 
 
 119. See id. at 646–56 (discussing the extent of isomorphism across states and providing 
statistical and case evidence of acculturation within a global social environment). 
 120. Id. at 640 (citations omitted). 
 121. See id. at 640–41 (“‘Cognitive dissonance’—defined broadly as the discomfort caused 
by holding two or more inconsistent cognitions—is a useful example. This phenomenon is part 
of a family of cognitive processes related to the basic human need to justify one’s actions to 
oneself and others. . . . An implication of [internal pressure such as cognitive dissonance] is that 
once actors internalize some role (or any other identity formation), they are impelled to act and 
think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated purposes and attributes of that role.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 641. 
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acuteness of the pressures applied. These variables, derived from 
social impact theory, are group “strength, immediacy, and size.”123 
Goodman and Jinks posit that: “(1) conformity with group norms 
becomes more likely as the importance of the group to the target 
actor increases (and as the importance of the issue to the group 
increases); (2) conformity increases as the target actor’s exposure to 
the group increases; and (3) conformity increases—up to a point—as 
the size of the reference group increases.”124 Ultimately, these three 
variables relate back to the need for a state to alter its target’s social 
environment in order for acculturation to be successful. By 
maximizing group importance, exposure, and size, a state ensures the 
maximum scope of a target state’s immergence in the appropriate 
social environment, and thus the likelihood that a target state will be 
susceptible to acculturation. 
For Goodman and Jinks, acculturation works in tandem with 
coercion and persuasion, forming a complete modality through which 
human rights norms are spread from state to state. Thus, in evaluating 
the development of death penalty doctrine in the United States, the 
role played by acculturation, in addition to those played by coercion 
and persuasion, must be evaluated to fully explain the similarities in 
United States developments to those that have occurred in Europe. 
III.  EVALUATING THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
From the outset it is clear that the death penalty doctrines of 
both Europe and the United States are on a similar trajectory. Just as 
Europe underwent an extended period of gradual movement toward 
abolition marked by a number of temporary setbacks before 
completely abolishing the death penalty in 1985,125 the United States is 
currently experiencing an overall trend toward abolition driven by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, despite the setbacks outlined above.126 
Goodman and Jinks’ modality provides three potential means of 
explaining the similarity in death penalty doctrine between Europe 
and the United States. 
 
 123. Id. at 642. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR entered into force in 1985. See supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
 126. See supra Parts I.A–I.B. 
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First, the similarity between the death penalty doctrines of 
Europe and the United States could be a result of attempts by Europe 
and other states that have abolished the death penalty to coerce the 
United States. Although Goodman and Jinks’ modality emphasizes 
coercion as a viable means of influencing state behavior, the power 
dynamics between the United States and other states make the 
possibility that the United States has been coerced much less likely. 
And there are no examples of successful outright coercion of the 
United States in this area.127 
Second, the similarity between Europe and the United States 
could be a result of direct attempts by Europe to persuade the United 
States. There is considerable evidence of such attempts,128 and the 
acknowledgement and use of European doctrine and practice by 
some members of the Court suggests that persuasion is one means of 
explaining the similarity between European and American death 
penalty doctrine. However, persuasion may not fully account for the 
similarities between the United States and Europe. Supreme Court 
Justices do not explicitly state that they are persuaded by the logic of 
foreign and international sources; instead, they merely provide these 
sources as examples of what other states have done.129 Indeed, some 
Justices vehemently reject any use of European or other foreign 
sources in Supreme Court opinions.130 These factors suggest that 
persuasion is probably not the only method of influence at work.131 
Finally, the method of influence that best seems to explain the 
great degree of similarity between European and American death 
penalty doctrine is Goodman and Jinks’ idea of acculturation. 
Acculturation suggests that the United States is following in Europe’s 
footsteps not only as a result of outright coercion and persuasion, but 
also because the beliefs and behavior of Europe, as a part of the 
culture of Western developed democracies surrounding the United 
States, have more subtly influenced the beliefs and behavior of the 
United States through a number of micro-processes.132 Acculturation 
is necessary to a complete understanding of the similarity between the 
 
 127. See infra Part III.A. 
 128. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 129. See infra notes 147–57 and accompanying text. 
 130. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 131. See infra Part III.B. 
 132. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 68 (describing the micro-processes of 
acculturation, which include “orthodoxy, mimicry, identification, and status-maximization”). 
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United States and Europe because, although the United States has 
resisted more overt forms of social pressure from Europe and other 
Western states, its treatment of the death penalty shows sensitivity to 
the tacit cognitive and social pressures produced by these other 
states.133 
A. The Failures of Coercive Influence 
Under Goodman and Jinks’ definition of coercion, it is 
theoretically possible that Europe and other Western states could 
provide the United States with some sort of material benefit for 
abolishing the death penalty or with some sort of material cost for not 
abolishing the death penalty, which could cause the United States to 
find that the benefits of moving toward abolition outweigh the costs.134 
However, the United States does not seem to have based its action on 
a response to such a cost-benefit calculation. 
Some of the only truly coercive measures that Europe and other 
states have utilized against the United States regarding the death 
penalty are threats not to invest in states that apply the death 
penalty135 and refusal to extradite criminals to the United States 
because of its use of the death penalty.136 Although European refusal 
to invest would cost the United States economically and refusal to 
extradite would cost the United States the ability to prosecute 
accused criminals within its jurisdiction, the United States’ strong 
economic and political power lessens the potential impact of these 
costs. These measures seem unlikely to change the United States’ 
behavior. And there is no evidence that they have done so. 
 
 133. See infra Part III.C. 
 134. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 633 (defining coercion as a “social 
mechanism . . . whereby states and institutions influence the behavior of other states by 
escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity through material rewards 
and punishments”). 
 135. See Letter from Alan J. Donnelly, Chairman, Delegation for Relations with the U.S., 
European Parliament, to George Bush, Texas governor (June 25, 1998), http://www.eurunion. 
org/legislat/DeathPenalty/EPDonBush.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (“Europe is the foremost 
foreign investor in Texas. Many companies, under pressure from shareholders and public 
opinion to apply ethical business practices, are beginning to consider the possibility of restricting 
investment in the U.S. to states that do not apply the death penalty.”). 
 136. See John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human 
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 187, 191 (1998) (discussing the European Court of Human Rights’ 
case Soering v. United Kingdom, which held that a man who was accused of committing murder 
in Virginia should not be extradited from the United Kingdom to the United States because of 
the possibility that he could receive the death penalty). 
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Most other coercive measures regarding the death penalty are 
international treaties signed by a number of states, such as the ICCPR 
and its Second Protocol and the CRC,137 all of which contain 
provisions on capital punishment. The United States has ratified the 
ICCPR with a reservation regarding its continued use of the death 
penalty,138 but it has not ratified the Second Protocol to the ICCPR or 
the CRC. One of the only material benefits that the United States 
would receive from ratifying these instruments is that it could then 
have the ability to enforce these human rights treaties against other 
state parties, and one of the only material costs of not doing so is that 
the United States cannot enforce these agreements. These treaties are 
not the coercive “‘agreements with teeth’” envisioned by Goodman 
and Jinks,139 and are thus relatively weak inducements for the United 
States to change its behavior. Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
they have had such a result. 
Any other coercive measures applied against the United States 
regarding the death penalty are likely to meet the same fate as those 
measures mentioned above because many of the most effective 
coercive measures are economic,140 and the United States is the richest 
country in the world. Any effective economically coercive measure is 
likely to damage the coercing state as much as, if not more than, the 
United States as such action could result in the loss of access to the 
United States’ lucrative markets and retaliatory action by the United 
States. The power dynamics implicated in coercion are acutely visible 
with regard to the United States, making coercion a very unrealistic 
method for altering United States human rights behavior.141 Coercion 
does not appear to have influenced United States actions regarding 
the death penalty in the past and is unlikely to work in the future. 
B. The Partial Successes of Persuasion 
In recent years Europe, other states, and independent actors 
have bombarded the United States with attempts to persuade it to 
 
 137. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Demleitner, supra note 44, at 141–42 (discussing the United States’ reservations 
about the ICCPR). 
 139. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 691. 
 140. See id. at 633–34 (using the Foreign Assistance Act, which is a United States statute 
providing financial assistance to needy countries who do not violate human rights, as an 
example of a coercive measure). 
 141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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abolish, or at least narrow, its use of the death penalty.142 Although 
these attempts seem to have made some impact on the United States’ 
death penalty doctrine, it is unlikely that persuasion is the only 
mechanism of state-to-state influence at work. As Goodman and 
Jinks set forth, persuasion requires the target state to be consciously 
convinced of the correctness of a proposition by the reasoning of the 
persuading state, with the assistance of both framing and cuing.143 
Although Europe and other states have made a series of efforts to 
persuade the United States in this way, the United States’ response to 
these efforts does not indicate that it was actually persuaded by them, 
despite the fact that the United States has often reached the 
persuading states’ desired conclusion. Persuasion has likely played 
some role in the development of American death penalty doctrine, 
but resistance to acknowledge that role, particularly by the Supreme 
Court, indicates that another mechanism of influence, such as 
acculturation, is also at work. 
Europe’s attempts to persuade the United States to follow in its 
footsteps in abolishing the death penalty began with the creation of 
the Guidelines to European Union Policy toward Third Countries on 
the Death Penalty in 1998,144 which outlined the European Union’s 
desire to “work towards universal abolition of the death penalty” and 
“[w]here the death penalty still exists, to call for its use to be 
progressively restricted and to insist that it be carried out according to 
minimum standards.”145 Shortly after this document was issued, the 
European Union began submitting a series of statements, letters, 
demarches, and amicus briefs to the United States in order to 
encourage it to abolish the death penalty, or at least to restrict its 
use.146 
This strong onslaught of persuasion has had some effect in the 
United States. Supreme Court Justices have cited international and in 
 
 142. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Guidelines to European Union Policy towards Third Countries on the Death 
Penalty, supra note 46, at II. 
 146. The EU has submitted a number of internal policy demarches that focus on the United 
States and its use of the death penalty, and it has written letters to American state and federal 
government figures and submitted briefs in United States death penalty cases. Lists of these 
documents and links to their full text can be found on the EU website: EU Policy and Action on 
the Death Penalty, EUROPEAN UNION IN THE U.S., http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/ 
DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). 
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particular European states’ practices in their opinions, acknowledging 
the value of these practices as examples of what other states have 
done.147 Citing the use of international opinions in Trop v. Dulles148 as 
precedent, Justice White referred to international opinion in 
footnotes in Coker v. Georgia149 and in Enmund v. Florida.150 Justice 
Stevens went so far as to discuss the value of the examples of “other 
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage” and “the leading 
members of the Western European community” in the text of 
Thompson v. Oklahoma.151 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford v. 
Kentucky discusses the practices of Western Europe and other 
countries at some length,152 and Justice Stevens even cites to an 
amicus brief by the European Union in a footnote in Atkins v. 
Virginia.153 Most recently, the brief of the European Union and the 
role of international opinion were discussed in the oral argument of 
Roper v. Simmons,154 and in his majority opinion for the case, Justice 
Kennedy discusses international and foreign sources extensively.155 
However, despite the long list of instances in which European 
and international persuasive attempts seem to have made a 
difference, there is reason to believe that these attempts were not 
effective because of their persuasiveness. In other words, although 
the United States has followed Europe’s path and even cited to 
Europe’s practice and persuasive efforts in doing so, it is possible that 
the United States did not do so because it felt “convinced of the truth, 
validity, or appropriateness” of European sentiment toward the death 
 
 147. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) (“We have previously 
recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual.”). 
 148. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958). Although Trop is not a death penalty case, it 
did provide precedent for citing international opinion that later influenced such citations in 
death penalty cases. 
 149. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977). 
 150. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982). 
 151. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. 
 152. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389–90 & nn.9–10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 153. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) No. 03-
633 (addressing the role of foreign law in a question by Justice Kennedy: “We’ve seen very 
substantial demonstration that world opinion is—is against this, at least as interpreted by the 
leaders of the European Union. Does that have a bearing on what’s unusual?”). 
 155. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78 (citing to the CRC, the ICCPR, and other treaties and to 
the practices of the United Kingdom and other countries and referring to “the overwhelming 
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”). 
04__PATTERSON.DOC 10/13/2006 8:50 AM 
1240 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1217 
penalty.156 Instead, the United States may have decided to follow 
Europe’s path for different reasons.157 This conclusion is supported by 
the fact that none of the citations discussed above attribute persuasive 
or precedential value to foreign or international practices; these 
practices are merely cited as examples. 
The conclusion that persuasion may not fully explain the 
similarities between Europe and the United States is also supported 
by the strong reaction of some Justices on the Supreme Court against 
the use of foreign or international law as persuasive precedent. 
Justice Scalia commences his series of attacks on the use of foreign 
law in decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution in his dissent in 
Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which he finds the plurality’s reliance on 
the persuasive precedent of foreign practice to be “totally 
inappropriate.”158 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stanford v. 
Kentucky expresses a similar rejection of foreign practice,159 as does 
his dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons.160 Furthermore, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Scalia’s objections in his Atkins 
v. Virginia dissent,161 and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas 
joined in Justice Scalia’s Roper v. Simmons dissent, denouncing the 
majority’s use of international and foreign sources.162 
Another motivation for considering the possibility that 
persuasive attempts were influential for reasons other than their 
persuasiveness is the fact that most of the references to foreign law in 
the above opinions were relegated to dicta in footnotes, and the fact 
the European nations chose a certain path was not a pivotal factor in 
the Court’s decision in any of these cases. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that the Justices use foreign law to provide justifications for 
opinions that they already hold in order to minimize the appearance 
of raw judicial activism. If this is the case, the Justices have not been 
directly persuaded by foreign law, but instead have formed their 
opinions by other means. Thus, it is important to consider what else 
 
 156. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 635. 
 157. See infra Part III.C. 
 158. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 159. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (asserting that “practices of 
other nations . . . cannot serve to establish . . . that the practice is accepted among our people”). 
 160. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 161. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324–25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 162. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he views of our own citizens are 
essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, [but] the views of other countries and the so-
called international community take center stage.”). 
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besides persuasion may be causing the gradual shift toward the 
abolition of the death penalty in the United States. 
C. The Strong Influence of Acculturation 
When it comes to the death penalty, the United States does not 
seem to be susceptible to the coercive influence of the European 
Union or other states. Similarly, it does not appear to change its 
course solely as a result of the carefully reasoned persuasive 
techniques from Europe or elsewhere. Therefore, the high degree of 
similarity between the developments in death penalty doctrine 
between Europe and the United States must result from another, less-
obvious method—the process of acculturation. 
As Goldman and Jinks set forth, before acculturation can take 
place the target state must be integrated into the appropriate social 
environment. In this case the United States most likely already 
identifies itself with the group of developed Western democracies, 
such as those in Europe, that have abolished the death penalty, and it 
probably also identifies with the global social environment that 
upholds human rights norms.163 Like the United States, these 
countries have democratic systems of government, are at similarly 
high levels of economic development,164 and share similar levels of 
respect for human rights in areas other than the death penalty. 
As the United States is already integrated into the appropriate 
social environment, acculturation next requires that European 
countries apply the correct combination of cognitive and social 
pressures.165 Both categories of pressures can be seen in evaluating the 
United States’ movement toward the abolition of the death penalty. 
Cognitively, Europe’s actions within the social environment of 
democratic, developed, rights-respecting countries create social-
psychological costs to the United States. The fact that the United 
States and Europe have a similar degree of respect for human rights 
in areas other than the death penalty allows both regions to view 
 
 163. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 164. In fact, many of these countries are members alongside the United States in the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the member countries of which are 
considered by many to be the most economically developed states. Ratification of the 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www. 
oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2825_293564_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 28, 
2006). 
 165. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text. 
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themselves as nations that respect human rights. The United States 
was at the forefront of the movement to create international regimes 
to increase respect for human rights globally.166 Respect for human 
rights is implicit in the identity and social role of the United States. 
The United States sees itself as a country that spreads human rights, 
and not one that violates them. 
The fact that the United States has not abolished the death 
penalty is cognitively dissonant with the rights-respecting identity of 
the United States. The increased resolve with which Europe has 
attempted to persuade the United States and other countries to 
abandon the death penalty creates significant pressure reinforcing this 
dissonance. Justice Kennedy acknowledges the cognitive dissonance 
caused by the differences in death penalty doctrine between the 
United States and other rights-respecting countries in his majority 
opinion in Roper v. Simmons.167 The more widespread and vocal the 
opposition to capital punishment becomes, the more contradictory 
the fact that the United States still uses capital punishment becomes 
with its identity as a nation that respects human rights. In order to 
resolve this cognitive dissonance, the United States, and in particular 
the Supreme Court, has continually restricted its use of the death 
penalty. 
Europe has also attempted to create social-psychological benefits 
for the United States to continue its trajectory along the same path as 
Europe in death penalty doctrine. By moving toward abolishing the 
death penalty, the United States preserves its membership in the “in-
group” of Western developed democracies that respect human rights. 
Again, as objections to capital punishment grow stronger and more 
widespread, the death penalty seems more and more contrary to 
human rights, and it becomes more and more unlikely that a country 
that still uses the death penalty would be revered for respecting 
human rights. Dean Harold Hongju Koh states, “I have little doubt 
 
 166. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 294 (2002) (“Since its founding, the United States has promoted 
international human rights as a rhetorical cornerstone of its foreign policy.”). 
 167. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (“[Constitutional] doctrines and guarantees are central to 
the American experience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and national 
identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is because we know it to 
be our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to 
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and 
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of 
freedom.”). 
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that America’s continuation of the practice [of capital punishment] 
has undermined our claim to moral leadership in international human 
rights.”168 In order for the United States to maintain its status as one 
of the world’s leaders in respecting human rights and to continue 
fitting in with its social environment of other Western developed 
democracies, it must continue to move toward abolition of the death 
penalty.169 
Socially, the United States experiences the pressure of shaming 
as a result of the frequent statements by Europe on the inhuman 
nature of the death penalty.170 In a 2000 memorandum on the death 
penalty, the European Union specifically mentions the United States 
and its practices regarding the death penalty, stating: 
The EU is deeply concerned about the increasing number of 
executions in the United States of America (USA), all the more 
since the great majority of executions since reinstatement of the 
death penalty in 1976 have been carried out in the 1990s. 
Furthermore, it is permitted to sentence to death and execute young 
offenders aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the crime, 
in clear infringement of internationally-recognised human rights 
norms.171 
The fact that the European Union singled out the United States’ 
violations of human rights provides a shaming mechanism pressuring 
the United States to move toward abolition. The European Union 
also attempts to shame the United States by emphasizing its likeness 
to countries that are not well known for respecting human rights.172 
Furthermore, every time Europe attempts to persuade the United 
States to abandon its practice of executing individuals in an amicus 
 
 168. Koh, supra note 166, at 310 (2002). 
 169. See supra Part I.B. 
 170. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 171. EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty (Feb. 25 2000), available at http://www. 
eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/eumemorandum.htm. The European Union’s mention of an 
increasing number of executions references one of the setbacks in the movement toward 
abolition of the death penalty, during which the number of executions rose to a high of ninety-
eight in 1999. The number of executions has decreased significantly since the writing of this 
memorandum, amounting to only fifty-nine in 2004 and sixty in 2005. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., 
supra note 100, at 1. 
 172. See Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8–9, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.03-
633) (placing the United States in a class with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Yemen, Pakistan, and China as the only countries to execute children since 
1990). 
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brief, letter, or demarche,173 the shaming effects of Europe’s 
statements on the death penalty are reinforced. 
The European Union also provides tentative praise to the United 
States when it further restricts its use of the death penalty, providing 
a small social benefit for moving toward abolition. After the United 
States stopped imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded 
individuals in Atkins v. Virginia, the European Union “welcome[d] 
the decision.”174 This light pat on the United States’ back indicated 
that the European Union would be even more enthusiastic toward the 
United States if it eventually decides to completely abolish the death 
penalty. 
The degree to which acculturation can be expected to influence 
American death penalty doctrine also turns on group importance, 
exposure, and size.175 Consideration of each of these variables further 
supports the argument that acculturation has played a role in the 
development of death penalty doctrine in the United States. As to 
group importance, the United States’ social environment, composed 
of Europe as well as other developed Western democracies, is 
certainly important to the United States. Especially since the creation 
of the European Union, Europe has become an economic and social 
force in the global arena, and the opinions of the EU are influential in 
international organizations to which the United States is also a 
party.176 As the issue of the death penalty has become more and more 
important to Europe, as evidenced by the time and effort spent by the 
European Union in combating the use of the death penalty internally 
and worldwide,177 it becomes a more important factor to the group as 
a whole. 
As to exposure, the United States’ closeness to the European 
Union, with respect to capital punishment and other issues, is 
increasing. In addition to globalization, which allows for increased 
exposure due to improved transportation and technology, the 
European Union has worked hard to ensure that the United States is 
 
 173. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 174. Letter from the European Union to the U.S. Office of the Political Counselor (June 21, 
2002), http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/DarylAtkinsPrRel.htm (last visited Apr. 
11, 2006). 
 175. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 176. For example, two of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are 
members of the E.U. (the United Kingdom and France). 
 177. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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continuously exposed to its opposition to the death penalty.178 The 
United States would need to be in a vacuum to avoid a high degree of 
exposure to its social environment in this area. 
As to size, the magnitude of the United States’ social 
environment that has abolished the death penalty continues to grow. 
Although the growth in the size of the group is only relevant up to a 
point,179 the EU and larger groups of Western developed democracies 
have certainly reached that point. Therefore, the three final variables 
influencing the effectiveness of acculturation are met, reinforcing the 
high likelihood that acculturation has been effective in guiding the 
death penalty doctrine of the United States down the same path that 
Europe has taken. 
In the footsteps of European death penalty doctrine 
developments, the United States has been constantly exposed to 
cognitive and social pressures to similarly alter its death penalty 
doctrine by other states that compose its social environment. The 
United States Supreme Court’s restriction of the death penalty in 
favor of human rights displays a response to these pressures 
characteristic of Goodman and Jinks’ mechanism of acculturation. 
Although some direct persuasion, and perhaps even coercion, may 
have been involved in American death penalty doctrine 
developments, the theory of acculturation provides a more complete 
understanding of how the United States has responded to changes in 
Europe and elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
The path the United States has embarked upon in continuing to 
restrict the application of the death penalty is oddly similar to that of 
Europe, which only finally abolished the death penalty after many 
years of slow reform. The similarities between the United States and 
Europe seem too uncanny to be coincidental, but traditional notions 
of how states influence one another, coercion and persuasion, do not 
seem to explain completely the similarities. The United States is far 
too powerful for the kind of cost-benefit calculations that accompany 
human rights norms to have serious effects, and the reticence of 
Supreme Court Justices to attribute precedential value to foreign and 
 
 178. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 642 n.73 (noting that the group size is only 
positively correlated with the extent of influence from about three to eight). 
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international law in their opinions makes it unlikely that persuasive 
efforts have single-handedly convinced the United States to change. 
The gap left by the theories of coercion and persuasion is filled 
by acculturation.180 Acculturation is a process that operates more 
tacitly than coercion and persuasion, explaining similarities between 
states by evaluating the internal cognitive and external social 
pressures that bear on a group as a result of its social environment. 
Acculturation more fully explains the similarities between the United 
States and Europe in the development of their respective death 
penalty doctrines by illustrating how the United States’ membership 
in the group of Western developed democracies that respect human 
rights, a group that also includes Europe, causes it to experience 
cognitive and social pressures to maintain its identity as a human 
rights leader and thus restrict its use of capital punishment. 
The United States Supreme Court in particular has demonstrated 
the effects of acculturation in its recent decisions restricting the death 
penalty under the Eighth Amendment. Although the Justices do not 
acknowledge the persuasiveness of foreign precedent, the Court’s 
death penalty decisions have almost always followed foreign 
precedent. It remains to be seen whether the United States will follow 
Europe all the way down the path to abolition, but the effectiveness 
that acculturation, alongside some persuasive and coercive measures, 
has had thus far on influencing the beliefs and behavior of the United 
States indicates that abolitionists can reasonably be hopeful for such a 
result. 
 
 180. Id. at 626. 
